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BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN
POLICYMAKING
DANIEL H. JOYNER*
"Lawyer and diplomat.. are not even attempting to talk to each other, turning
away in silent disregard. Yet both purport to be looking at the same worldfrom
the vantage point of important disciplines. It seems unfortunate, indeed
destructive, that they should not, at the least, hear each other."

The above statement was made by renowned international lawyer and former
state department official Louis Henkin in 1979.1 Professor Henkin was bemoaning
what he saw as a significant and disturbing gap in communication between the
international legal community and the foreign policy community. 2 That such a gap
did exist and does exist today is an easily discernible fact. One need only read
accounts of an international lawyer's and a State Department or Foreign Ministry
policymaker's thoughts on any given subject of international affairs to see that the
two are not even speaking the same language, let alone following the same
analytical process when examining the issues. While one talks of norms, precedent
and international order, the other's rhetoric is replete with references to national
interest and practical exigencies. While one looks to the codicils of the UN
Charter and a seemingly never-ending supply of rules contained in international
conventions and the customs of nations for guidance, the other looks to the latest
administration position paper.
From the perspective of the State Department/Foreign Ministry policymaker,
it is completely natural that this should be the case. Why, after all, should she
*Martin J. Hillenbrand Scholar in the School of Public and International Affairs and Dean Rusk Fellow
in the Center for International Trade and Security, The University of Georgia. BA Brigham Young
University, JD Duke Law School. The author wishes to thank Gary Bertsch, Scott Jones and especially

Jan Huner of The Netherlands' Ministry of Economic Affairs, for helpful review and comments of
drafts of this article.
1. LOUIs HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1979) [hereinafter
How NATIONS BEHAVE].

2. In this paper, the terms "international legal community" and "international lawyers" make
reference to those legal scholars and practitioners who are primarily concerned with issues of public,
not private, international law, and in particular those in the academic community. The "foreign policy
community" or "foreign policymakers" referred to in this paper are those government officials in a
variety of agencies within national governments, but particularly within the primary foreign
policymaking organ, at a variety of levels whose responsibilities include significant foreign
policymaking or policy execution roles.
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devote hours to studying legal opinions, when even the international lawyers can't
all seem to come up with the same answer to the simple question "is this legal?"
And even if they could, she has a lot more to worry about than some abstract
principles of pseudo-law that she knows very well can be broken with near
impunity - she knows because she's seen it done a thousand times by her
government and others. She knows what her job is - to forward the interests of her
state client.3
As for the lawyer, he is by now used to being ignored and his ideas scoffed at
as being hopelessly idealistic and out of touch with reality. Eventually, he came to
accept that his was a discipline which is at the very fringe of consideration by most
policymakers, and he is content to theorize and write law review articles about how
opiniojurissive necessitatis is at the heart of custom. He stopped trying to have
meaningful conversations with the people in government years ago. Frankly, he
got tired of his ideas being marginalized and being made to feel like an ivory tower
utopianist. The best he can hope for is to get his book published and make tenure
early.
As Henkin observed, this is a highly inefficient and truly harmful state of
affairs, for both parties.4 Yet it continues, the officials formulating positions and
trying to get a head in the big game, basing their foreign policy assumptions on
institutional wisdom and the odd consultation with an outside area specialist; the
lawyer writing to and attending conferences with other lawyers; while all the time
both communities are looking at the same sets of facts and trying to grapple with
the most important issues of state behavior, the relationships of states to each
other, and the best ways to promote effective and advantageous interaction
between nations.
This is not to say that their perspectives on these and other issues are not quite
different. This indeed is at the very core of the communications gap that has
always existed between the two communities.
However, the process of
globalization continues to effect an ever-increasing phenomenon of legalization of
international relations, as witnessed by the modern multiplication of international
institutions and regimes and high frequency of front-page issues of international
politics in which international law and institutions play a significant role.5
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the debate on international security issues.
This fact leads to the urgent understanding that the international legal community
and the foreign policy community have a strong mutual interest in overcoming the
gaps in communication and culture which have long separated them.
This brief essay will attempt to identify some of the causes of this lack of
communication and cooperation between international lawyers and foreign
policymakers and will propose pragmatic means by which this sizeable gap may be
3. Generalizations of attitudes used in this paper, such as those of an average foreign
policymaker, can of course be criticized as overly stereotypical and refuted on a case by case basis.
However, throughout I have attempted to capture the core sentiments and assumptions of most
policymakers and international lawyers respectively as they bear on the issues addressed.
4. How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2.

5. See Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385 (2000).
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narrowed. It will offer some prescriptions for both communities for improving
their accessibility and acceptability to the other, since as with most instances of
miscommunication, no one party is solely to blame. The paper will begin by
offering a review of some relevant literature in both the fields of international law
and international relations, and will assert that the specific gap between the
international legal community and the foreign policymaking community has gone
largely unaddressed in academic literature in a targeted, systematic fashion. 6 It
will proceed to provide such an analysis, and will conclude with a practical
application of the analysis and normative prescriptions based thereon to current
issues regarding the Missile Technology Control Regime, a multilateral
nonproliferation body.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
In recent years there has been a wealth of scholarship on the evolving
relationship between the academic disciplines of international relations and
international law and the substantive role of norms in international politics.
Regime theorists such as Abram and Antonia Chayes and Oran Young have
written extensively on the relationship between power and rules and procedures in
international politics. 7 Institutionalists such as Robert Keohane have focused on
the role of formal and informal institutional arrangements between states and the
role of rules within those arrangements in coordinating behavior and shaping the
expectation of actors. 8 English School political science scholars as well have
pointed to the inherent connection between the concept of an international
community of states and the binding force of international law. 9 As Hedley Bull
has written:
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states,
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.' °

6. There has of course been significant work done on the general issue of the role of international
law in foreign policy. See FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (1989); THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers, ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE ROLE OF LAW].
7. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993); ORAN
R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATIONAL RESOURCES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1989) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION]; Oran R. Young, InternationalLaw
and InternationalRelations Theory: Building Bridges, 86 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROCEEDINGS 172 (1992).

8. See Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, in INTERNATIONAL
RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 187 (Robert J.
Beck, Anthony Clark Arend & Robert D. Vander Lugt, eds., 1996); Robert 0. Keohane and Lisa L.
Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 39 (Summer 1995)
[hereinafter CUSTOM, POWER].
9. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1999).
10. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 13
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International lawyers as well have devoted a great deal of energy to
harmonizing the work of the two disciplines and forging analytical as well as
rhetorical links between them. Leading legal scholars in this field include AnneMarie Slaughter, Kenneth Abbott and Michael Byers. These scholars, while
asserting the normative independence and value of international law, have made
great strides in opening up the field to analysis in international relations (IR)
theory terms, and in examining the role of international law in world politics." As
Slaughter has commented:
Just as constitutional lawyers study political theory, and political theorists inquire
into the nature and substance of constitutions, so too should two disciplines that
study the laws of state behavior seek to learn from one another... If social science
has any validity at all, the postulates developed by political scientists concerning
patterns and regularities in state behavior must afford a foundation and framework
for legal efforts to regulate that behavior... From the political science side, if law
- whether international, transnational or purely domestic - does push the behavior
of States toward outcomes other than those predicted by power and the pursuit of
national interest, then
political scientists must revise their models to take account
12
of legal variables.
There has also in the field of international relations, particularly since the
1993 publication of the book Bridging the Gap by Alexander George,1 3 evolved a
body of scholarly writing addressing the perceived disconnect between the
international relations academic community and the foreign policymaking
community. 14 This work proceeds from the realization that the two communities,
while nominally focusing their energies on the same sets of facts relative to cross
border political interaction, have almost entirely insulated and independent
cultures.' 5 Several works in this field have attempted to identify the underlying
disparities in analytical approach, questions asked and results desired by the two
how the
communities, and have fashioned recommendations to both concerning
16
widening gap in communication and cooperation might be narrowed.
Despite the long history of disciplinary independence of international law and
its primary ownership by students of law as opposed to political theory, there
seems yet to be a residual impression within some non-legal sectors of the

(1977); See C. A. W. MANNING, THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1962).
11. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and InternationalRelations Theory: A
Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Kenneth W. Abbott, InternationalRelations Theory,
InternationalLaw, and the Regime GoverningAtrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361
(1999); CUSTOM, POWER, supra note 10; THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 7.
12. See Burley, supra note 12.
13. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, BRIDGING THE GAP: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN FOREIGN POLICY

(1993).
14. See MIROSLAV NINCIC AND JOSEPH LEPGOLD, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER (2002); BEING
USEFUL: POLICY RELEVANCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (Nincic & Lepgold eds., 2000)
[hereinafter BEING USEFUL]; Bruce W. Jentleson, The Needfor Praxis; Bringing Policy Relevance Back
In, 26 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 169 (2002).
15. See GEORGE, supra note 14, at 3.
16. See BEING USEFUL, supra note 15.
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academy that international law as an academic exercise is largely subsumed within,
and categorizeable as a sub-discipline under, the overarching subject matter
heading of international relations theory. Indeed, international law is thus listed in
many political science department registers, highlighting the oft-perceived
substantive and procedural softness of international law and the tenuous nature of
its existence as a true system of law comparable to domestic legal systems. 17 Thus
to develop an analytical treatment of the divergences in form and substance
between the academic study of international relations and the practical field of
foreign policymaking must to the minds of many within the academy, particularly
in secondarily related fields but also to some within the IR community, include8
scholarship in the field of international law underneath its conceptual umbrella.'
However, this is a thoroughly misconceived view of the classical relationship
between international law and international political theory.
While its intellectual roots stretch back to Thucydides and beyond,
international relations theory as a distinct academic discipline is, after all, a relative
newcomer to the academic scene, having been developed in the 1930's and 40's by
such scholars as Edward Carr and Hans Morgenthau and their followers. 19
International law, by contrast, has been a distinct academic discipline in legal
circles since the writings of Grotius in the early seventeenth century and is today a
rich and highly developed scholarly field in its own right. 20 Largely due to these
genealogical facts, the attributes, assumptions, and analytical processes of
international legal scholarship are quite different from traditional international
relations theory, as witnessed by modern attempts at reconciliation between the
two disciplines. 2 1 And while the work of George and others in bridging the gap
between IR theorists and foreign policymakers is generally useful in many of its
points by analogy, in specifics there is yet much to be said concerning the very
distinct gap in understanding and communication as between international lawyers
and foreign policymakers.
II. THE GAP
This gap can be identified through similar analytical means as those employed
by George and his followers, but upon divination it turns out to be in substance
quite uniquely constituted. A primary step in isolating the causes of the
cooperative disconnect between international lawyers and policymakers is to
identify the supply and demand dynamics present.
A. Demand
If we consider policymakers to be the consumers and international lawyers to
17. See BULL, supra note 11.
18. See generallyCUSTOM, POWER, supranote 10, at 21-34.
19. EDWARD HALLETT CARP, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939 (2nd ed. 1946); HANS
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (3rd ed. 1960).

20. See generallyCUSTOM, POWER, supra note 10, at 3-46.
21. See id.
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be the providers in this scenario, it is useful to begin by examining what the
demand factor is, i.e. what do policymakers need and want. As an introduction to
their world, it is preliminarily important to note that foreign policymaking goes on
at many levels and by many different officials in government, and not just by the
foreign minister or secretary of state and their top aides.22 Often there are
relatively few centralized or top-down sources to guide officials in the day to day
making and execution of policy between states, and they are left to interact with
their counterparts in foreign governments and with private actors with little but
their own internally generated resources and individual experience and judgement
to guide them. 23 This phenomenon of decentralized interaction at all levels of
national government has only increased as the number of regulatory and issue
areas with international aspects, from the environment to securities law to human
rights, has multiplied.24
Added to this fact is the non-ideal reality that most government officials live
in a world in which they are, especially at the policy execution level, constantly
devoting large amounts of their time to putting out fires.25 Their responsibilities
are often varied and decisions on discrete issues must often be made with precious
little time to deliberate on the ramifications of their action or inaction on
international norms.26 And while they possess a great deal of information and
receive counsel from experts both within and without of government, they see their
decisions as being made as a result of judgment and common sense in furtherance
of the interests of their state as opposed to theory or norm-based decisions made
for greater and more abstract goods, such as to benefit global humanity or the
international system in general.27 This is not to assert categorically that such
causes may not receive important secondary consideration, but simply that a
realistic understanding of the value structure of most foreign policymakers, and
most government officials for that matter, must place national interests as
unchallenged primary objectives.28 What they need from outside sources,
therefore, is topical and specific information and recommendations, communicated
briefly and in understandable language, and laid out in logical and convincing
fashion based on their underlying goal - making sound decisions that forward the
state interest.
Policymakers often additionally hold latent assumptions which have
contributed to the existence of the gap between themselves and members of the

22. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE AND JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD
POLITICS IN TRANSITION 25 (1977).

23. Id. at 25-26.
24. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS:

ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 177-78 (Michael Byers, ed. 2000).

25. See generally George, supranote 14.
26. Id.
27. Id.; See also Condoleeza Rice, Promoting the National Interest, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb.,
2000, at 45, 47, 62.
28. See Rice, supra note 28, at 47.
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international law community. 29 The most widespread and invidious of these are
that international law is largely idealistic and impractical, that it is generally
ineffectual in carrying out its own prescriptions, and that it should seldom if ever
be deferred to when there is a real and pressing issue of national interest, and
particularly national security at stake. 30 Policymakers therefore need both these
assumptions addressed, as well as their substantive information needs met before
they will give greater consideration to international legal concerns and make them
a more important part of their overall policymaking calculus.
B. Supply
International lawyers, particularly in the academic setting, are in an entirely
different business. They primarily traffic in ideas about the rules that do, and
should hold the international system of state relations together. 3' Their work is
mainly in discerning what the rules are, their meaning, scope of application and
effect.32 The stock in trade among international lawyers in academia is basically
the same as among international relations scholars. It is publications in books and
scholarly journals, conferences among leading experts, and teaching the next
generation of scholars.33 And like the IR academic community, the culture of the
international legal community of scholars is marked by insularity, perpetuated by
shared language, educational background and international system-centric
perspective.34 However, a number of fundamental distinctions may be made
between international lawyers and international relations theorists. Unlike IR
theoretical work, the substance of international law - the norms themselves - are
meant to be part of the workings of the international system, i.e. they are meant to
be used by policymakers.35 Without actual application and recognition by
policymakers and policy executors, international law can be said to have even less
intrinsic value than analytical IR theory. IR scholars seek to generate theories
explaining the actual behavior of states and identifying motivating factors and
causal connections between social and administrative variables, an understanding
of which has value in and of itself and great potential for policy application in
unforeseeable future scenarios of foreign affairs concern even if it is not presently
utilized.36 International law, on the other hand, is a collection of normative
prescriptions and standards which, if not put to use merely take up room on library
shelves. 37 Thus at face value there would seem to be ample incentive for
international lawyers to bridge whatever cultural and communications gaps exist
between themselves and the policymaking community, if for no other reason than
29.
30.
from IR
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See George, supra note 14.
In support of these assumptions, policymakers can find no short supply of arguments drawn
literature, particularly within the classical and neo-realist schools of thought.
CUSTOM, POWER, supra note 10, at 47-48.
See id.
GEORGE, supra note 14, at 4.
GEORGE, supra note 14.
See CUSTON, POWER, supra note 10, at 15; BULL, supra note 11, at 141.
See CUSTOM, POWER, supra note 10, at 21.
Id. at21,48.
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to preserve their relevance and value as a discipline. However, international
lawyers face obstacles in this regard that IR scholars do not.
As previously noted, IR theory essentially provides analytical frameworks for
explaining and in some cases predicting actual phenomena.38 International law by
contrast is a system of norms, largely contrived by lawyers, which purport to
regulate significant areas of international relations, but which are currently at an
evolutionary stage in which they are in large measure not supported by institutions
capable of effectively adjudicating and enforcing their prescriptions.39 This
recognition of the evolutionary stage of the international legal system, while very
valuable for lawyers in understanding the continuing importance of supporting the
development of international institutions and norms, does little to persuade foreign
policymakers to comply with international law in cases where doing so is
seemingly at odds with the short-term interests of their state clients. Government
officials in fact often view international law as merely a strategic tool, useful for
justifying their actions in harmony with its precepts and for condemning
incongruous acts by adversaries, but easily unmentioned when the action of their
state lies contrary to its dictates. 40 And international lawyers, it must be said, have
done little to usefully change this perception and the resultant lack of serious
consideration of international law by policymakers. 4 1 This is due in part to many
international lawyers' apparent fear that greater engagement and cooperation with
policymakers on a substantive level might effect a degree of watering down of the
objective theoretical integrity of international law, which has developed largely in
seclusion for centuries, and which has been the almost exclusive province of
academic thinking and writing by lawyers.42 As in other areas of the law, lawyers
are generally suspicious of outside influence in the substance and procedures of
their profession, which like the other classical professions has as a general rule
been allowed to be self-regulatory.43
International lawyers are especially suspicious of the intentions of foreign
policymakers, whom they know are largely unconcerned with many of the
theoretical underpinnings of international law, such as the maintenance of a
logically and theoretically consistent international legal regime founded on normbased conceptions of principled international interaction, and whose focus is rather
on immediate problem-solving and national interest with a general conceptual
grounding in realist notions of the influence of power and self-interest in all
aspects of international politics. 44 It is also likely a manifestation of the reluctance
of many international lawyers to be viewed as hired guns for any government,
including their own, in its designs to show the world its compliance and other
nations' non-compliance with international norms, and thereby be robbed of their

38. Id.
39. CUSTOM, POWER, supranote 10.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2.
Id. at Introduction.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2003

BRIDGING THE GAP

perceived objectivity and intellectual integrity. 4
1II. BRIDGING
Having established some of the divergences of culture and perspective as
between international lawyers and foreign policymakers, it remains to be
considered how those divergences may be addressed so as to foster an increased
level of cooperation between the two communities. This paper will attempt to
accomplish this in two separate sections, containing recommendations specific to
each group.
A. InternationalLawyers
As will be clarified herein, it is upon international lawyers that the heaviest
onus of responsibility for bridging the gap with policymakers should fall. This is
due to two particular considerations.
Firstly, as between the two sides,
international lawyers are possessed with the greatest opportunity to take upon
themselves this burden.46 While the demands of their traditionally valued activities
will remain, it will surely be conceded that the capacity exists for international
lawyers, particularly those in the academic setting, to re-prioritize those activities
and to place increased cooperation with government officials nearer the top of the
list. 47 This is decidedly more true for international lawyers than it is for
policymakers.
Which brings us to the second consideration. It is proposed that the
motivation for bridging the lawyer/policymaker gap also should rest most
particularly in the court of the international lawyer.48 This is caused by two
distinct factors. First, as previously stated, the very continuing existence of the
discipline of international law depends on its use and consideration by foreign
policymakers.49 Without that relevance, international legal scholarship will
become increasingly moot and will very possibly decline in importance and,
eventually, find little place in the world of academia.
Second, under a correct conceptualization of their business, international
lawyers should be motivated to place greater emphasis on increased engagement
with government officials in order to bring about their core interests.50 The heart
of what proponents of international law have always wanted, and the foundation
upon which the concept of international law is based, is that a rule of law and not
of power should obtain in international politics. 51
This is the theoretical
underpinning of the entire exercise of international normative thinking. 52 It is
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.

48.. Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
See Jentleson, supranote 15.
See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2, at introduction.
Id.
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clear, however, that the traditional scholarly and detached activities of international
lawyers will be insufficient to bring this change about, if it is to be brought about
at all. To in fact achieve such change, the proponents of an international rule of
law must work within the existing power structures of national governments to a
degree as yet unrealized, and make their wealth of wisdom and experience in
normative construction and institutionalization accessible to and usable by those in
power, who are in the end the only ones who can actually bring about fundamental
change to the existing international order. Policymakers have to want to be a part
of the international law system or it will fail.
How then is this to be accomplished by the international law community?
Through an emphasis on education and through increased and more effective
communication, international lawyers must make a concerted effort to address the
concerns and needs of policymakers as outlined herein. Firstly, there must be an
organized initiative with the goal of educating policymakers on the origins and
salient characteristics of the international legal system and international law in
general. There is a palpable lack of understanding of international law among
foreign policymakers, particularly in the United States but also among government
officials generally.53 This ignorance breeds confusion and misunderstanding of the
nature and application of international law, which too often leads simply to
dismissal of the importance and relevance of norms in foreign policy decisionmaking. A proper education in international law must include both theoretical and
practical perspectives on the current evolutionary state of the international
legal
54
system and on principles of state compliance with international norms.
This is perhaps the most difficult task facing international lawyers, as a better
education for the policymaking community is easy enough to point out as a
desirable end, but decidedly more difficult to actually achieve. However, in recent
years, there have been great strides in educational programs for judicial officers in
the foundational elements of international law through such means as the
American Society of International Law (ASIL) Judicial Outreach service and
others, through which judges from around the world are given a crash course in
international law specifically as it bears upon cases most often heard in their
courts. 55 Such programs are constructed to accommodate the busy lives of
government officials, and are extremely useful for establishing an elementary
understanding of the existence and proper application of international law norms in
specific areas of concern.56 Such courses in the foreign policy context could easily
be designed and administered by Universities and other interested nongovernmental organizations like the ASIL and would constitute a very useful step
toward addressing the pervasively held assumptions of the policymaking
53. Id.

54. See the excellent treatment of various forms of normative regulation and their relevance to
specific issue-area governance in Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Sofq Law in
InternationalGovernance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421 (2000).
55. The American Society of International Law, 2001 Annual Report: Buildingfor the Future 2-3
(2001), available at http://www.asil.org/annual.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,2003).
56. The American Society of International Law, Newsletter: October/December 2002, availableat
http://www.asil.org/newsletter/news.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
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community relevant to international law, which form a formidable obstacle to their
more substantive and beneficial engagement with international lawyers.
Second, international lawyers must take to heart the recommendations of
several writers in the international relations disciplinary context who have
observed that communication with government officials is not effectively achieved
through the writing of academic journal articles.5 7 In the international law context
this is no less true. And while it is certainly not proposed that all writing efforts be
devoted to the task of bridging the international law/policymaking gap, much could
be accomplished through the publication by eminent international law experts of
articles in excellent foreign policy periodicals such as ForeignAffairs, as well as in
more mainstream news media outlets. Even if these publications are little more
than boiled down summaries of more expanded arguments made in leading legal
journals, in view of the readership constituency of these publications, such efforts
will be much more likely to reach the desks of foreign policy makers, partially due
to the brevity and clearness of language which those formats demand.
This is not of course to say that direct communication between international
lawyers and foreign policymakers should not be attempted. Indeed, this is surely
the most effective means of increasing cooperation between the two communities
to the extent it can be effectuated. Volunteering to draft brief memoranda on
specific issues, and making oneself available for consultation on demand, are
efforts by international lawyers sure to be appreciated by officials who often seek
to supplement their in-house research and institutional wisdom with outside
advice.
When such advice is given, or memoranda drafted, and even in articles
targeted to reach the eyes of policymakers, close attention should be paid to the use
of vocabulary and identification of motivating dynamics which government
officials will both understand and value. This prescription does not merely refer to
the use of "legalese" in lawyer-official communications. Rather, it refers
additionally to the types of arguments made to motivate action or inaction on the
part of the policymakers when persuasive arguments are warranted (recognizing
that in many instances such arguments will not be appropriate, and that the product
sought by officials will simply be a run down of relevant norms, cost and benefit
analysis). International lawyers must take to heart the identification of foreign
policymakers' interests as described herein. Thus an argument based on "the best
interests of the international community" or "the normative soundness of the
international legal regime" is likely to hold much less sway in the mind of a
government official than arguments which may well be in support of action or
inaction for the good of humanity, but which may also legitimately be based on
important perceived national interests, including reputational and strategic
interests, which it is the job of the international lawyer to point out can be seriously
57. See JOSEPH LEPOLD & MIROSLAV NINCiC, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY AND THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE 2-3 (2001); Arthur A. Stein, Counselors, Kings,
and InternationalRelations: From Revelation to Reason, and Still No Policy-Relevant Theory, in BEING
USEFUL: POLICY RELEVANCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 51 (Miroslav Nincic & Joseph
Lepgold eds., 2000); Jentleson, supra note 15.
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affected by breaches of international norms. In short, lawyers must do a better job
of "writing to their audience" than they have done in the past.
There will of course be situations in which casting international legal
compliance in national interest terms will be more difficult than in others. In such
circumstances some attempt can be made to equate national interests with
international interests, and these arguments will likely be persuasive to a good
many in foreign policymaking circles, particularly as the process of globalization
and international institutional enmeshment makes the interdependency of nations
inan array of issue areas increasingly manifest. 58 However, in extreme cases of
the divergence of international and national immediate benefit, the lawyer faces an
advisory dilemma which his or her personal ideologies must dictate, but in which
there should be awareness of the fact that as one's advice generally is given greater
credence through the recognized presence of both substantive knowledge and
realistic understanding of national policymaking exigencies, so one's advocation of
systemic and overarching international long-term interests at the expense of shortterm national interests
will be heard with an increasingly friendly ear by
59
government officials.
These efforts by lawyers at the procedural level are very likely to significantly
narrow the gap between international lawyers and policymakers. However, it is
this paper's assertion that at the substantive norm creation and maintenance level
as well, efforts may be made to increase international law's acceptability, and
thereby usefulness, to rational-minded policymakers. There has, in recent decades,
been a movement within some circles to introduce elements of expanded
constitutionalism into the international legal system to a degree never before
attempted. 60
This movement aims to make of the international legal and
institutional system a regime which in both breadth and depth of regulatory
coverage, particularly into relationships traditionally considered to be within the
exclusive cognizance of domestic law, is unprecedented, and wholly revolutionary
in the history of international normative thinking. 6' This change is most poignant
in the modern development of the areas of international human rights law and
international criminal law, which seek not only to govern relations between states
in their capacity as world citizens, but also the relationships between states and
their citizens and of individuals to each other.62 And while this extension of
international legal coverage is satisfying to many on grounds of protecting
universal human dignity, it pushes the limits of international law's inherent
58. Woodrow Wilson said in 1916, "We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of
the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects
mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia." THE
POLITICS OF WOODROW WILSON: SELECTIONS FROM HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 258 (August

Heckscher ed., 1956).
59. See HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supranote 2 at introduction.

60. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31
(1995/1996) [hereinafter Human Rights]; BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995).
61. See Human Rights, supranote 61, at 34.

62. Id. at 39.
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limitations in institutional competence and enforcement difficulties, and thereby its
overall credibility.
It has additionally constituted an increasing source of
discomfort to many in government circles due to the potential implications for
principles of national sovereignty which such developments bear. 3
This paper therefore takes the currently unpopular but theoretically
compelling position that international lawyers should reexamine the fundamental
aims of international law and should strive through their influence to limit its
substantive coverage to those areas of international interaction most suited for its
regulatory purview. In doing so, they will not only preserve the theoretical
integrity of the enterprise of international law, but will make its precepts eminently
more palatable to foreign policymakers, who will be impressed more by logic and
practical necessity of substantive lawmaking than by idealistic and unnecessary
extensions of international law's coverage into areas of international and domestic
interaction perceived as traditionally and importantly the province of national
governments. 4
B. ForeignPolicymakers
For their part, foreign policymakers must try to overcome the conceptual
barriers into which they and their predecessors seem to have boxed themselves by
their underlying assumptions of structural realism, power politics and the
supremacy of self-centered national interest. 65 These indeed are partially valid and
practical foundational understandings, but can be taken altogether too far to the
exclusion of other valid conceptualizations of the international system of state
interaction. Indeed, within the field of international relations theory, significant
challenges to a strict realist understanding of world politics have been mounted in
recent decades, notably in this context by the branches of liberal institutionalism
and constructivism.
These theoretical advancements should encourage a
63. See John R. Bolton, The United States and the InternationalCriminalCourt: The Risks and
Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America's Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 167, 169 (2001).
64. For more on this matter of the substantive content of international law see J. SHAND WATSON,
THEORY & REALITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 203 (1999); Curtis A.
Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Il, The CurrentIllegitimacy of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation,
66 FORDHAM L. REv. 319,369 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,
97 MICH. L. REv. 390, 396 (1998); Daniel H. Joyner, International Human Rights Law: A System
Perspective,FORTHCOMING.
65. See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power
Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391, 410 (1992) ("By denying or bracketing states' collective authorship of
their identities and interests... the realist-rationalist alliance denies of brackets the fact that competitive
power politics help create the very 'problem of order' they are supposed to solve - that realism is a selffulfilling prophecy.") [hereinafter Anarchy]. There is growing literature within international relations
theory challenging rationalism as the conclusive explanatory paradigm of individual and collective
decisionmaking, particularly among behavioral decision theorists, constructivists, and prospect
theorists. See Stephen Walt, Rigor or Rigor Mortis?, 23 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 4 (1999); Herbert
Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science, in RATIONAL
CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY (Hogarth & Redereds 1986); Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences,246 SCI. AM. 1(1982).
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reconceptualization of foreign policy priorities and the value structures and policy
calculations of policymakers. 66 Institutionalism has in very persuasive terms called
attention to the role of formal and informal regimes, which have been multiplying
exponentially in recent decades and increasing both in scope and in depth, in
reducing the effects of multipolar anarchy at the heart of realist thought, by
67
promoting cooperation, information transfer, and trust among member states.
Constructivism, one of the most influential theories of the past decade, has focused
on the changing nature of the identities and interests of states, and has assaulted the
traditional realist dogma that both of these attributes are static and the cause of an
inherently conflictual international structure. 68 Rather, say constructivists, the state
of international anarchy is "what states make of it," pliable to the formative acts
and intentions of states.69 Institutionalism and constructivism, among other
modem explanatory theories, illuminate the additional roles of community
perception, international norms and institutional cooperation in affecting state
behavior. This understanding lends legitimacy to the proposition that international
law is a viable motivating and regulating dynamic in the international community
of states, and should therefore be taken seriously as an integral element in foreign
policy considerations.
It is undeniable that in the modern era and going forward international norms
and institutions have and will increasingly have an important role to play in
international politics. And although a thorough treatment of the causes and
dynamics of this phenomenon is not possible in the context of this essay, it will
suffice to recognize that in a majority of nations, governments give deference to
international legal prescriptions and do not lightly breach them. 70 As the process
of globalization continues, so by necessity will the process of legalization of
international relations, as countries increasingly look to rules to order their
relations in areas such as trade, environmental protection, collective security,
maritime movement and space rights. 71 Enmeshment in international regimes and
world engagement will make understanding and working with international law
norms of increasing importance to foreign policymakers.72 This should provide the
66. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 8; Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity
Formationand the InternationalState, 88 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 384, 385 (1994) [hereinafter Collective
Identity].
67. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 1 (1989); INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 8; M.A.
Levy et al. The Study of InternationalRegimes, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1/3:267-330 (1995).
68. Collective Identity, supra note 67, at 384.

69. See Anarchy, supra note 66; Wendt, supra note 68, at 388.
70. As Louis Henkin famously commented "Violations of law attract attention and the occasional
important violation is dramatic; the daily, sober loyalty of nations to the law and their obligations is
hardly noted. It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of
internationallaw and almost all of their obligationsalmost all of the time." How NATIONS BEHAVE,
supra note 2.

71. See the excellent special issue entitled Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 3
(2000).
72. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 1 (1995); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER
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necessary motivation for policymakers to step out of their conceptual limitations
and seek to foster real and meaningful cooperative links with international lawyers,
who as outlined above have complimentary motivations, and who should be happy
to meet policymakers halfway in attempts at broader and more effective
communication between the two communities.
The term "halfway" is used purposefully here, because of the impression held
by many in the international law community that policymakers have not made
satisfactory efforts to engage international lawyers, despite the foregoing list of
perhaps as yet unperceived motivations, and that they are in a sense waiting for the
international lawyers to present a finished product of normative structures which
they can both accept and understand in toto before giving international norms
greater consideration in policy formation.7 s In so doing, of course, policymakers
are not sufficiently mindful of their own necessary role, through communication
and cooperation with international lawyers in the formative process of international
norms itself, in creating just such a product. It is, after all, states that make
international law and not international lawyers.
Policymakers should therefore be open to education programs in international
law as discussed above, and should actively seek advice from international lawyers
both inside and outside of government on specific issues facing them in policy
formation and execution. They should make a point to educate themselves through
reading the short and hopefully issue-specific articles recommended above to be
written by international lawyers in publications already widely circulated among
policy officials. These are reasonable steps which can easily be harmonized with
the many demands on policymakers, and which are indeed incumbent upon them
as a means of better preparing themselves to fulfill the duties of their position and
most effectively serve their nations' interests.
IV. CASE STUDY: THE MTCR
Since hortatory exercises such as the above are always clarified by concrete
example, this paper will proceed to consider a case study involving a discrete issue
area in international politics in order to show how the foregoing prescriptions may
be put to use in the real world.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal, non-treaty
political arrangement, currently consisting of 33 state members and founded in
1987 for the purpose of controlling the proliferation of rocket and unmanned air
vehicle systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
their associated materials and technology. 75 It is one of a number of informal
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
73. See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2, at introduction.

74. While traditionally the writings of eminent legal scholars were considered to have weight in
the creation of international norms, the use of this pseudo-source of law in the judgments of the
International Court of Justice has declined markedly in recent decades. Id.
75. See generally Aaron Karp, The Spread of BallisticMissiles and the Transformation of Global
Security, 7 THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 106, 116 (2000); Kenneth Weiss, The Limits of Missile
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multilateral regimes in the WMD proliferation area, but is distinct in that unlike
other multilateral nonproliferation regimes the MTCR is not closely associated
with a multilateral treaty regulating development of subject technologies and
materials. 76 It is rather a sui generis nonproliferation supply-side regime,
comprised of the owner/supplier states of missile-related technologies." Due to
this fact, it has been likened to a cartel of supplier states, determined to keep
missile technologies within their circle of knowledge and possession, thus creating
a continual and enforced haves and have-nots reality. 78 There has been growing
consensus, however, that the supply-side approach to regulating WMD
proliferation in this area, which the MTCR represents, has been largely ineffective
in curbing the proliferation of missile technologies. This perception became acute
in the 1990's as four non-regime states, the DPRK, Iran, Pakistan, and India were
in active pursuit of long-range ballistic missile capabilities and with the
contemporaneous emergence of a willing supplier's group consisting of Russia,
China and the DPRK, all of which were either wholly outside the MTCR's
framework or had been sanctioned by MTCR members for failing to control
exports of sensitive missile technologies.79
As one commentator has noted, the single most invidious problem the MTCR
faced was its inability to establish norms applicable to its subject matter.80 As
previously stated the MTCR is a voluntary organization of states, devoid of
institutional rulemaking or adjudicatory powers. 8' And while the state delegates to
MTCR plenaries do by consent agree on "guidelines" for export control and other
nonproliferation efforts, compliance with these guidelines is, again, purely
voluntary with only reputational cost to deter non-compliance. 2 In this way the
MTCR is little different from other multilateral nonproliferation regimes such as

Diplomacy: Missile Proliferation,Diplomacy, and Defense, WORLD AFFAIRS, Vol. 163, Issue 3 (2001).
76. Such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signatureJuly 1,

1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; or the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, openedfor signature
Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800. See David S. Gualtieri, The System of Non-proliferation Export Controls,
in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 467, 477-78 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Barry Kellman, Bridling the International Trade of
CatastrophicWeaponry, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 755, 820 (1994).
77. Mark Smith, On Thin Ice: First Steps for the Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY (July/August 2002), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_0708/smithjul-aug02.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter On Thin Ice].
78. Mark Smith, Rules for the Road? The InternationalCode of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation, DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY Issue No. 63 (March - April 2002), available at
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd63/63op3.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Rules for the
Road].
79. See Richard Speier, How Effective is the Missile Technology Control Regime?
NONPROLIFERATION BRIEF 4 (7), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2001); Dinshaw
Mistry, BallisticMissile Proliferationand the MTCR: A Ten-Year Review, CONTEMPORARY SECURITY
POLICY, Issue 18, Vol. 3 (1998).
80. Rules for the Road, supranote 80.
81. Barry Kellman, supranote 78, at 822.
82. See Anastasia A. Angelova, Compelling Compliance with InternationalRegimes: China and
the Missile Technology ControlRegime. 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419 (1999).
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the Wassenaar Arrangement 8 3 and the Nuclear Supplier's Group,8 4 but as
previously noted the subject technologies these regimes seek to control are
addressed in binding multilateral treaties, which are legally enforceable against
non-compliant states.
With this disparity in mind, in the late 1990's MTCR member countries began
to consider ways to introduce norms into the area of missile technology
proliferation, and began to develop the idea of a code of conduct to supplement, or
under some interpretations replace, the role of the MTCR in the area. 5 At the 15t"
plenary meeting of MTCR member states in October 2000, a draft International
Code of Conduct (ICoC) generating demand-side norms was circulated and
discussed, and in November of 2002, 92 countries agreed to adopt the ICoC at a
meeting at The Hague. 86 The adopted version of the ICoC contains a recitation of
agreed-upon principles, commitments, incentives for compliance, and confidence
building measures.8 7 And while the commitments are carefully worded so as to
avoid the attachment of legal obligation to their terms, they do include
commitments by signatory states to ratify a number of international treaties on
space exploration, to undertake measures to prevent the proliferation of WMDcapable missiles, to reduce national holdings of the same, to exercise vigilance in
the consideration of assistance to space launch vehicle programs in other countries
(a notorious front for military-use missile and WMD delivery system programs),
and not to support ballistic missile programs in countries which "might be
developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in a way incompatible with
the norms established by the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties."88 The
ICoC seeks to ground the missile proliferation regime in universally applicable
commitments and principles and thus to introduce markedly increased levels of
normative foundation to the regime. 9
However, the ICoC has met with a mixed reaction from important states both
within and without of the MTCR. Criticisms have ranged from fears of inadvertent
legitimization of some missile programs due to the minimalist approach of the
ICoC, to some rankling of nationalistic feathers and the expression of concern that
attempts through the ICoC to regulate missile programs, many of which are being
conducted for ostensibly civilian space-development purposes, impinge upon
national prerogatives in important and wholly legitimate areas of technological

83. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies, adopted July 11-12, 1996, available at http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/IE96.html
(last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
84. See Gualtieri, supra note 78, at 473.
85. On Thin Ice, supra note 79.
86. Preventing Missile Proliferation, DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (May 2001),
at
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd57/57note.htm (last visited Feb 5, 2003); MTCR Plenary Meeting,
DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (October-November 2002), at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd67/
67nr10.htm (last visited Feb 12, 2003).
87. Rulesfor the Road, supra note 80.
88. See PreventingMissile Proliferation,supra note 88.
89. On Thin Ice, supra note 79.
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innovation. 90
It is not the purpose of the current examination to vet the various significant
policy considerations surrounding adoption of the ICoC. However, when viewed
on a regime-institutional level, the case of the MTCR does present fertile ground
for analysis of possible cooperative interactions between international lawyers and
foreign policymakers within the issue area.
To an international lawyer, the current state of the area of missile and WMD
proliferation represents an issue area perfectly suited for international regulation by
means of soft, as opposed to hard, international law. 91 Some elaboration on the
meaning and use of these terms is due. International law classically recognized
two sources of binding normative development. The first is treaties, which are
written agreements between two or more parties, the obligations of which apply
solely to those executing the treaty. 92 Treaties are binding upon signatories and
subject to adjudication in international judicial fora. 93 The second is customary
international law, which develops through the acts of states accompanied with
sufficient opinio juris, or expressed sense of legal obligation, of state officials. 94
Custom may form parallel to or wholly independent from treaties and may bind not
only those who participate in its creation, but potentially also other states who do
not successfully obtain persistent objector status while the customary norm is in
creation. 95 While not without theoretical and practical weaknesses as a true system
of law, these two sources have traditionally been held to produce binding
obligations, or "hard" international law, enforceable to the extent any international
norm is enforceable upon subject state parties. 96
The concept of "soft" international law, by contrast, is relatively new. It is a
scholarly movement to attempt to recognize the value of some written instruments
as having many of the characteristics of international law, and thus contributing to
97
normative development, while remaining non-binding in a strictly legal sense.
Speaking of the proponents of this movement, one commentator has written:
they stress that these instruments fulfill at least some, if not a great number, of the
criteria required for rules to be considered rules of international law and cannot
therefore be simply put aside as non-law. In other words, they acknowledge that
there exists a considerable 'grey area' of 'soft-law' between the white space of
law and the black territory of non-law. Simultaneously, they make the salient
point that the 'grey area' may greatly affect the white one and explain, sometimes
90. Id.
91. See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2, at introduction.
92. AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW [Hereinafter AKEHURST'S]
(7th ed., Peter Malanczuk ed., 1997). See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27,
1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, also available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm(last visited

Feb. 12, 2003).
93. See AKEHURST'S, supranote 94.
94. See UN CHARTER, STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38 (listing the
sources of international law).
95. See AKEHURST'S, supranote 94.
96. See generally AKEHURST'S, supra note 94, at Chapter 3.
97. G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
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98
in considerable detail, in what ways 'soft law' can have legal effects.

A number of scholarly treatments have been done on the sources and uses of
soft law in the modem international legal and political system. One of the best of
these is by Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal, entitled "Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance," which appeared in the summer of 2000 in International
Organization. Abbot and Snidal develop therein a methodology for determining
issue areas best regulated by soft and hard international law respectively.99 They
conclude that hard law is best utilized in areas of international interaction in which
the value placed on making credible commitments is high, reduction of long-term
transactions costs from continual re-negotiation is important, political strategies
may be supplemented by adjudicative or otherwise legalistic international regimes,
and where delegation of authority to international fora is an attractive means for
remedying inherent problems of incomplete contracting. I°° They conclude that
soft law, by contrast, is most attractive in issue areas in which a premium is placed
on low initial contracting costs, where the use of hard law would present
unacceptable sovereignty costs (which are highest when proposed international
legalization purports to regulate the relationships between a state and its citizens or
touches upon important issues of national security), and where the novelty and
complexity of the issue area create a high degree of uncertainty and possibility for
positional change which make hard law enshrinement of norms unattractive.' 0 '
Abbott and Snidal also recognize soft law as being an efficient means of
compromise between antagonistic positions between states,
particularly in the early
02
stages of normative consideration of the subject area.1
The distinction of hard and soft law and the recognition of soft law
instruments has met with disapproval by some in the international legal
community, however. As expressed by Sztucki:
Primo, the term is inadequate and misleading. There are no two levels or
"species" of law - something is law or is not law. Secundo, the concept is
counterproductive or even dangerous. On the one hand, it creates illusory
expectations of (perhaps even insistence on) compliance with what no one is

obliged to comply; and on the other hand, it exposes binding legal norms for risks
of neglect, and international law as a whole for risks of erosion, by blurring the

threshold between what is legally binding and what is not.l13

However, as D.J. Harris has responded:
While it may be paradoxical and confusing to call something "law" when it is not

98. Id. at 187-8; See generally COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING

NORuMs INTHE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
99. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in InternationalGovernance, 54
INT'L ORG. 421 (2000).
100. Id. at 428-9.
101. Id. at 434.
102. Id. at 444.
103. Jerzy Sztucki, in Festkrift Hjerner550-551 (1990).

DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31:3

law, the concept is nonetheless useful to describe instruments that clearly have an
impact on international relations and that may later harden into custom or become
the basis of a treaty.104
If an international lawyer were to maintain Harris' position, therefore, and
view the proliferation of missile and related technologies area as an almost
paradigmatically well suited issue area for soft law coverage, based on the Abbot
and Snidal methodology, he or she might conclude that the evolution of the
normative structure in this area would be well served by the primitive use of soft
law mechanisms, and that in so doing the states involved would contribute not only
to the normative progression and coherence of the subject area, but would also
make a significant contribution to the theoretical understanding of the use of soft
law mechanisms in international relations, which is a cutting edge and highly
intriguing area for study and further publication.
However, despite the appeal of this form of analysis and these policy
recommendations to an international legal scholar, little if anything contained in
the foregoing analysis of hard and soft law would appeal to a foreign policymaker,
or tempt such an official to invest much time in considering them. Again, such
policy professionals are chiefly concerned with effectiveness of policy in achieving
the goals which are in the best interest of their states, and they have very little time
to devote to or interest in considering the possible large-picture effects of their
policy on international legal system development or on the processes and theories
of international law. Thus an examination by an international lawyer along the
above lines will be of little assistance to them and will likely be ignored. But it is
crucial to point out once again that in being irrelevant to policymakers, such
analyses, although profitable in their element as progressions in theoretical
understanding of international law, fail the ultimate aims of most international
lawyers - to have norms and a rule of law govern international relations and not a
rule of power and self-interest.
Drawing from the lessons learned from the examinations of supply and
demand previously noted therefore, a more useful paradigm for international
lawyer/policymaker cooperation in this area, and by analogy in others, can be
sketched out. Instead of long-winded examination and in this context useless
theorizing, in the case of the MTCR as in other cases international lawyers could
be most helpful to policymakers by focusing on the particular facts of the issue
area and the problems at hand, and attempt to communicate briefly and effectively
the international
legal
issues involved
and specific
policy-relevant
recommendations.
In the MTCR case, such an analysis might proceed as follows. First to the
underlying threat.
There is a clear link between effective methods of
nonproliferation of missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction and their resultant non-use by dangerous regimes and the national
security of virtually every state in the world. It is further clear that the missile

104. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (5th ed. 1998).
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technology proliferation regime as it currently exists is lacking in normative
foundation. The first question therefore is whether or not greater normativization
in this area is desirable. Effective analysis in this regard could look to analogous
issue areas, such as the other weapons nonproliferation regimes to view the effect
greater normativization has had on the underlying threat. It could be briefly and
clearly shown that nonproliferation regimes in these areas, when closely associated
with binding international agreements, have aided in decreasing the threat of
proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction by formalizing underlying
normative principles and making them openly recognized as obligatory, thus
05
increasingly drastically the reputational costs of openly flouting the norms.1
However, in the missile technology area, the exact technologies involved create a
situation that includes not only threats of sovereignty impingement, but also
significant and uniquely difficult issues for normative coverage, principally due to
the dual-use nature of many such technologies. As mentioned previously, missiles,
unlike nuclear weapons themselves, have many legitimate civilian uses quite apart
from their military uses, many of which are themselves considered legitimate.' 0 6
These include, most importantly, use in peaceful space exploration and
development.10 7 To add to the difficulty, there is virtually no means available to
distinguish between a civilian space missile program and a military missile
program up until the very late stages of its development. Thus normative
progression in this area has been stalled over difficulties in addressing the specific
technologies involved.
However, effective international legal analysis can be offered by going
outside of the weapons proliferation regime area and examining cases of normative
development in other areas in which the substantive issue area has been especially
sensitive and complex. One such illustrative example is the area of international
trade. Trade between nations has historically been among the most sensitive of
areas to regulate because of the potential far-reaching effect of such regulation on
perceived domestic prerogatives and the importance of successful international
trade to national economies. 0 8 After the Second World War, the largest economic
powers concluded on a relatively loose association to preliminarily cover the area
of international trade, established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).' 0 9 The GATT was technically a binding international agreements, but it
It was adopted only
was in actuality quite soft in a number of ways.
"provisionally," its commitments were not subject to effective adjudicatory

105. Although this area presents the familiar logical conundrum wherein proving effectiveness
practically equates to proving the negative (i.e. effectiveness of regimes is best shown by the nonoccurrence of regulated activities), there is a general consensus, which could be supported by data, that
multilateral export control regimes have been effective in at least facilitating national export control
policies, which are an important and demonstrably effective tool in stopping, or at least slowing, the
proliferation of WMD.
106. See Preventing Missile Proliferation,supra note 88.
107. Jd.
108. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2nd ed. 1998).
109. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [Hereinafter GATT] available at
http://www.ciesin.org/TG/PI/TRADE/gatt.html(last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
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institutions, and it contained a relatively lenient withdrawal clause."10 The GATT
however served to introduce some nornativization to the field of international
trade, and in doing so illustrated in a fairly non-threatening way to its signatories
the advantages of mutual cooperation based on norms in the area."' The GATT
signatories learned this lesson so well, in fact, that in 1995 they collectively agreed
to establish a much harder regime in the cross-border trade area, that of the World
Trade Organization, which provided a much more binding institutional framework
for the GATT with authoritative adjudication
of disputes and a number of
2
additional substantive area agreements."
There are a great number of examples of variations on this same theme which
can be pointed to for illustrative purposes. One such example is Agenda 21, the
Forest Principles, adopted at the 1992 Rio Convention on Environment and
development, in which the instrument adopted was fairly precise, but not legally
binding." 3 Another is the corollary case of the original Vienna Ozone Convention
in which states were legally bound, but in imprecise ways.14 Perhaps most
analogous in form to the missile technology nonproliferation area is the joint Food
and Agriculture Organization-UN Environment Program (FAO-UNEP) regime
which was established to institutionally monitor the informed consent of states to
international transfers of hazardous chemicals and pesticides.1 5 The FAO adopted
a "code of conduct" to address distribution and use of pesticides in 1985 and the
UNEP established "guidelines" for exchange of information regarding
internationally traded chemicals in 1987.116 In 1989 the two organizations jointly
amended their respective soft law instruments to add a requirement for prior
informed consent of states to hazardous chemical and pesticide transfers and
established a procedure for handling the verification of such consents. 117 The two
organizations sponsored extensive consultation with outside experts on the issues
and provided technical assistance."l 8 By the late 1990's the member states of both
organizations had authorized formal treaty negotiations and in 1998 a convention
was formally adopted which closely followed the FAO-UNEP system.' '9
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BRIDGING THE GAP

These differing structures provide flexibility to meet the needs of the
underlying substantive issue area, while providing for some preliminary
normativization in the area, which allows states to see the rules in practice and
learn from actual application rather than engage solely in negotiated speculation. 120
These examples show better than detached theory that normativization through soft
law means has decided advantages of providing a process for learning and
evolution of understanding of the possibilities for normative coverage in a variety
of areas, with very many such primitive soft law instruments evolving over time
into harder, more binding and formalized instruments and institutions. Thus, there
is a sound basis in logic and observed analogous phenomena to conclude that the
further normativization of the area of missile technology nonproliferation will be
beneficial to states involved in that process, and that soft law means such as an
international code of conduct with obligations limited either by imprecision or
non-binding character (both in fact being present in the adopted version of the
ICoC) can have an important role to play in the normative evolution of the regime.
Such analytical devices as analogy and briefly expressed logical and
situationally-specific argument are much more likely than the previous generalized
theoretical observations to be appealing to foreign policymakers, and therefore
effective in illustrating the advantages of normativization and in influencing policy
choice in a discrete area. These therefore should be the analytical modes of choice
in communications between international lawyers and foreign policymakers,
whether made through solicited briefs, personal consultation or in journal and other
publications whose audience is likely to include policymakers.
CONCLUSION
This essay has attempted to ascertain and provide a brief practical
examination of the certain separations, both in communication and cooperation,
which currently subsist between members of the international law and foreign
Upon divination, this gap can be seen to be
policymaking communities.
pervasively based in ideology, professional culture, value structure and shared
The prescriptions for change in method and in substance of
suspicion.
communication and engagement between international lawyers and foreign
policymakers and in their respective underlying professions and cultures provided
herein will be novel to some on both sides of the proposed exchange, and will not
be actualized without much difficulty and soul searching by all concerned.
However, as the gap between the two communities was not created overnight, so
its narrowing will not be accomplished without a substantial re-direction of the
efforts and mindsets of both groups. It is submitted that through this process, both
sides will reap rewards of increased communication and cooperation, which will
inevitably inure to the benefit of both communities, the professions of which are of
such timely importance to international society in the modern era, and the
synergies among which have scarcely begun to be realized.
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